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Abstract 
We examine the cultural context for individual’s trust in public institutions. To shed some light on 
possible cultural explanations from a more comparative perspective and cover a wider set of 
cultural aspects, we use indicators of cultural dimensions by Kaasa et al. (2014) based on 
Hofstede’s (1980) approach. Multilevel regression analysis is conducted with individual-level data 
from two waves of the European Social Survey (2008 and 2010) and regional-level data from 
multiple sources. Confirmatory factor analysis is used to construct the indicators of social and 
institutional trust and corruption. Our results suggest that individuals tend to trust institutions less 
in regions with large power distance. Hence, an important key for governments being more 
successful in achieving their aims seems to be related to improving the sense of participation and 
civic responsibility. 
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1. Introduction 
Institutional trust plays an important role in economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; 




enforce the law, assure property rights and keep tax legislation stable, then more investment and 
other economic activity can be expected (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Institutional trust is essential 
in the governance of a modern state since enabling citizens to accept government authority 
supports the legitimacy, effective functioning, and stability of democratic systems (Mishler and 
Rose, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2015), particularly as democracy cannot rely on coercion to the same 
extent as other regimes might (Hetherington, 2005). Paradoxically, the spread of democratic 
systems has been concomitant with a decline in institutional trust (Zmerli, 2012), increasing the 
importance of understanding its determinants. 
Here, the focus has been on government institutions and citizens’ personal perceptions of 
political corruption and their social trust (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). However, cultural aspects 
should also be considered to be determinants of an individual’s institutional trust. The cultural 
context may affect the way individuals perceive public institutions (Grimmelikhuijsen and 
Porumbescu, 2013). Furthermore, according to social influence theory (Kelman, 1958; 1960), an 
individual’s attitudes and beliefs are influenced by the referent others surrounding him or her. 
The interconnection between culture and institutions has been a recurrent theme in 
institutional economics. Institutions, generally understood as formal and informal norms and rules 
shaping human interactions and social exchanges (Hodgson, 2006; North, 1990), share with culture 
the ability to shape individual and collective preferences and attitudes (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; 
De Jong, 2011; Hofstede, 1980; Hodgson, 2006). As in the case of formal rules and constraints, 
culture, defined as a set of values and beliefs shared by a group of individuals (Greif, 2006; 
Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 2011), also affects an individual’s choices, providing an indicative road 




Culture matters because it affects the attitudes and behaviour of individuals. In recent 
decades, the role of cultural context has gained momentum in the economic and institutional 
literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2008). Cultural aspects have 
been used to explain well-functioning institutions (Tabellini, 2008), law enforcement (Acemoglu 
and Jackson, 2017), institutional change (Gërxhani and van Breemen, 2019), good governance 
(Kyriacou, 2016), redistribution (Gründler and Köllner, 2020). The role of culture in an 
individual’s institutional trust has received less attention. Although some studies have explored 
the source of institutional trust by considering a limited set of values (Yang and Tang, 2010; Dong 
and Kübler, 2018; Zhai, 2018), some cultural dimensions (Hadarics, 2016; Mahmud, 2017; Pitlik 
and Rode, 2017; Baniamin et al., 2020), ethnic minorities (Lühiste, 2006; Zmerli 2012; van der 
Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017) and having a communist background (Mishler and Rose, 2001; 
Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012), we did not find any analysis incorporating some cultural theory 
with a whole range of dimensions covering various elements of culture. 
We aim to fill this gap by analysing the relationship between cultural context and an 
individual’s institutional trust. We apply multilevel regression using individual-level data from the 
ESS (2008; 2010) and society-level data from different sources. In addition to cultural-level social 
and institutional trust and corruption perception, the cultural context in a wider sense is 
operationalised based on Hofstede’s (1980) approach, using indicators from Kaasa et al. (2014) 
for the cultural dimensions of individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, 
and masculinity-femininity. We also include the communist background as one cultural aspect. 
Altogether, these societal-level indicators enable us to shed some light on possible cultural 
explanations from a comparative perspective. Similar to previous studies (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015; 




the initial indicators into latent constructs describing different phenomena. Instead of countries, 
we focus on within-country regions as society-level units as there is reason to believe that the 
cultural context varies significantly within countries (Kaasa et al., 2014; Baskerville, 2003; Dolan 
et al., 2004; Beugelsdijk et al., 2006; Hofstede, 2001). We analysed data for 2008 and 2010 for 
more than 47,000 and 45,000 respondents from 85 and 81 regions, respectively. 
Our results show that citizens tend to have less institutional trust in regions with larger 
power distances. This outcome indicates a need for policy makers to adopt more inclusive 
decision-making processes to increase civic engagement among citizens. The empirical evidence 
also suggests that in regions with higher uncertainty avoidance, individuals have less trust in 
political parties but tend to have more trust in the police. This suggests that the possible impact of 
cultural context might be, and is reasonable to expect to be, different for different institutions. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The following section provides the 
theoretical background. Section 3 introduces the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 draws conclusions and discusses the implications and limitations of this study. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Institutional performance and social trust 
Trust in public institutions manifests itself when citizens assess public institutions as promise-
keeping, accountable, efficient, competent, caring, predictable, open, transparent, fair and honest 
(Hooghe et al., 2015; van der Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017). Hence, individuals judge how their 
institutions act in the citizens’ interest (Miller and Listhaug, 1990) and produce outcomes aligned 




explained, directly or indirectly, through the institutional performance approach and social trust 
approach. 
According to the institutional performance approach, institutional trust is a consequence 
of institutional performance (Lühiste, 2006; Berg and Hjerm, 2010). Both administrative 
effectiveness and government’s ability to boost economic performance are emphasised (Suh et al., 
2012; Stoyan et al., 2016). However, explaining institutional trust only through actual performance 
has received much criticism because of ignoring citizens’ assessment of this performance (Hooghe 
and Zmerli, 2011). As Berg and Hjerm (2010) note, both the actual performance and the 
evaluations individuals make are relevant. Hence, institutional trust is often explained as an 
evaluation of and response to the perception of design, performance and outputs of institutions 
(Mishler and Rose, 2001; Suh et al., 2012; Godefroidt et al., 2017). Citizens’ evaluation also 
extends to their perception of public officials behaving ethically with integrity and loyalty and 
placing public interests before personal interests (Wang and Wan Wart, 2007), including 
corruption perception. 
Empirical works have confirmed that individual-level evaluation of institutional 
performance (Berg and Hjerm, 2010; Yang and Tang, 2010; Hadarics, 2016; Stoyan et al., 2016; 
Godefroidt et al., 2017; Dong and Kübler, 2018; Zhai, 2018) and society-level indicators of good 
governance (Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Hooghe et al., 2017) are positively related to different 
indicators of institutional trust. Some empirical studies have reported that institutional trust is 
negatively related to individual-level corruption perception (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; 
Habibov et al., 2017; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 2001; 2005). 
The social trust approach explains institutional trust as an extension of the trust individuals 




Hjerm, 2010; Suh et al., 2012; Godefroidt et al., 2017). This general propensity to trust others 
‘spills over’, creating institutional trust through civic associations (Suh et al., 2012; Mishler and 
Rose, 2001; 2005). Social relations and cooperation among citizens promote trust and a sense of 
civic engagement, which are important for institutional trust (Putnam et al., 1993; Guiso et al., 
2004) and institutional compliance (Tabellini, 2008). 
Empirical evidence has indicated that institutional trust is positively related to individual-
level social trust (Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012; Zmerli, 2012; 
Hadarics, 2016) or interpersonal trust (Lühiste, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Godefroidt et al., 
2017). 
 
2.2. Cultural context 
The cultural environment around individuals is an important factor to consider. Culture can be 
defined as a set of personal values, beliefs and behaviours shared by a group of people, be it a 
country or a region (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 2011). In general, culture is seen as something 
different from personality, which is an individual-level concept. Culture is a societal-level concept 
and a group phenomenon. 
From a narrower perspective, it can be expected that an individual’s institutional trust is 
influenced by the cultural-level institutional trust of the people surrounding this individual. This 
agrees with social influence theory (Kelman, 1958; 1961) and has also been referred to as 
endogenous social effects (Manski, 1993) or group effects (Firebaugh, 1978). Not all citizens have 
first-hand experience with public institutions (Hooghe and Zmerli, 2011; Roussey and Deffains, 
2012); therefore, they have to rely on something else, such as others’ opinions. Even when 




others due to the perception that the majority must be right or because of social desirability. The 
role of cultural orientation in shaping individual attitudes has often been shown (Inglehart and 
Baker, 2000; Adamczyk, 2013; Boyd and Chung, 2012), and it has been suggested to aggregate 
individual-level measures to capture group-level characteristics when examining ecological and 
individual hypotheses in multilevel studies (Blakely and Woodward, 2000; Hayes and Boyd, 
2017). It can be assumed that the average attitudes of a region towards a particular institution or 
institutions in general might influence the attitudes of an individual living in that region. The 
indicators of average and individual attitudes describe two different phenomena herein; i.e., while 
an individual indicator characterises an individual, an aggregated or average indicator describes 
the environment where this individual acts. They can correspond, but they might be different. It is 
possible that, for example, in a region generally supportive of the parliament, there are individuals 
who have negative attitudes towards the parliament. 
From a wider perspective, the whole cultural environment surrounding the individual is 
important for individual institutional trust. There are different ways to describe cultures. 
One option is to examine certain phenomena, such as the level of corruption perceived in 
a society or society-level social trust. Concerning society-level corruption perception, it is possible 
that not all citizens have their own experiences; hence, the general perception in a society might 
prove relevant. Empirical studies have reported that institutional trust is negatively related to the 
society-level indicator of corruption perception (Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Hakhverdian and 
Mayne, 2012; van der Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017; Dong and Kübler, 2018). Regarding society-
level social trust, it can be assumed that the spillover effect mentioned previously also works at 
the societal level and that a person living in a more trusting environment also has higher trust in 




individual-level institutional trust, and the results are mixed. Newton and Zmerli (2011) analysed 
data from the World Values Survey and found that society-level general trust was positively related 
to political trust. Zmerli (2012) analysed data from the ESS and found that aggregated social trust 
was not significantly related for trust in political institutions but was positively related to trust in 
regulative institutions. 
Another option is to cover a variety of values, beliefs and attitudes based on a well-known 
theory offering a set of cultural dimensions characterising the mindset prevalent in a society. Such 
theories are based on the assumption that it is possible to describe cultures through different 
dimensions so that every culture can be shown as one point in a multidimensional space. The 
literature offers many different sets of cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994; 
Inglehart and Baker, 2000; House et al., 2002). Our analysis is based on the concept of Hofstede 
(1980). Although his approach has often been criticised (see Chiang, 2005; McSweeney, 2002; 
Gooderham and Nordhaug, 2001), much of this criticism tends to address the measurement 
problems. Hofstede’s dimensions have been used extensively during recent decades in both the 
theoretical and empirical literature in different fields of social sciences and can be regarded as a 
grounded approach for describing culture (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014). Next, Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions are introduced and discussed in the context of institutional trust. 
First, power distance indicates the extent to which an unequal distribution of power and 
hierarchical relations are accepted in a society without further justification. In cultures with larger 
power distance, more centralised decision structures and formal rules are regarded as normal. This 
means that people perceive governmental structures to be far from them with fewer opportunities 
to be involved in decision-making processes. People might hold more fatalistic views, waiting for 




2015). As institutional trust can be expected to be promoted by contacts between citizens and 
institutions (Mahmud, 2017), institutional trust can be assumed to be lower with a large power 
distance. At the same time, in cultures with smaller power distance, inequality and hierarchy are 
less accepted, and one could argue that people could then be more critical of the rulers. Hence, 
power distance might influence an individual’s institutional trust in both directions. Empirical 
evidence, unfortunately, is scarce. Kaasa (2015) showed that regional-level institutional trust in 
Europe was negatively related to power distance. Mahmud (2017) found different indicators of 
power distance related to institutional trust. However, it is expected that the results are different 
for authoritarian regimes. Yang and Tang (2010) showed that traditional hierarchical values, Dong 
and Kübler (2018) and Baniamin et al. (2020) showed that authoritarian values, and Zhai (2018) 
showed that traditional values (e.g., blind loyalty and paternalism) were positively related to 
institutional trust in China. Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer (2014) demonstrated that the effect of 
transparency on institutional trust is less positive in South Korea than in the Netherlands due to 
the larger power distance in the former country compared to the latter. 
Uncertainty avoidance describes how people cope with unfamiliar and uncomfortable 
situations. In the case of low uncertainty avoidance, ambiguous situations and conflicts are 
regarded as natural and constructive and vice versa. In uncertainty-avoidant cultures, people are 
less trusting, and rules play an important role in offering assurance (Kaasa, 2015). There might be 
a higher need for order and structure (Hadarics, 2016), and formalisation is favoured over 
deregulation (Mahmud, 2017). Hence, in the case of higher uncertainty avoidance, institutions can 
be more supported (Hadarics, 2016; Mahmud, 2017). The empirical evidence is mixed in this 
regard. The studies of Kaasa (2015) and Mahmud (2017) showed no relationship between 




importance of adherence to norms and personal security to be positively related to institutional 
trust. 
The cultural dimensions of power distance and uncertainty avoidance may also better 
capture the formation of an individual’s institutional trust in post-communist contexts than the 
classical simple dummy variable. A communist background is inevitably an important culture-
related aspect in the relationship between public institutions and citizens. An individual’s 
preferences are claimed to be shaped by the political regime (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). 
Institutional trust has been shown to be much lower in countries with a communist past (Habibov 
et al., 2017). The main argument is that a transition time is required for individuals to adapt, also 
cognitively, to institutional changes and to trust new kinds of institutions. Communist societies 
have strict rules, restrictions and sanctions to suppress initiative. However, at the same time, jobs 
or accommodations are ensured by the institutional system (Kaasa, 2015), thereby promoting a 
fatalistic view captured by power distance. Similarly, it has been noted that in post-communist 
societies, people regard corruption as something that is unavoidable (Habibov et al., 2017). For 
instance, in such contexts, cautious attitudes, caused by the danger of being punished for certain 
behaviour when reported, have been found (Sztompka, 2000; Kaasa et al., 2011; Kaasa, 2015). 
This, again, can be captured by the uncertainty avoidance dimension. 
Masculinity(-femininity) reveals to what degree values such as achievement, assertiveness 
and competition, called masculine by Hofstede, dominate over feminine values such as tolerance, 
modesty and solidarity. In feminine societies, good relations are valued, and, thus, more 
cooperation can be expected. That, in turn, might engender more trust in institutions through civic 




regional-level study of Kaasa (2015) indicated that masculinity is negatively related to institutional 
trust. 
Individualism(-collectivism) demonstrates whether people prefer to act as individuals or as 
group members. In individualist societies, individual freedom and autonomy are valued, and 
people are expected to take care of themselves. In collectivist societies, high levels of group loyalty 
are expected. It can be assumed that in collectivist societies, people are more motivated to 
cooperate, which in turn might enhance institutional trust (Halman and Luijkx, 2006; Kaasa, 2015). 
However, individualism has also been claimed to support political trust (Barni et al., 2016). In 
individualist societies, people might feel freer from social pressure; this might encourage them to 
express their opinions, engage in social processes (Allik and Realo, 2004; Kaasa, 2015) and thus 
have more trust in institutions. The analysis of Kaasa (2015) showed that individualism is 
positively related to regional-level institutional trust. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
All individual-level data used in this study came from the ESS (2008; 2010), which includes 
questions about many different fields and has been repeated every other year since 2002. The 
number of European countries involved ranges from 21 to 29 for different waves, and the countries 
involved also vary to some extent. Information about the region where the interviews took place 
enables us to analyse data not only by countries, but also by within-country regions. In this article, 
regions at the NUTS1 level were used as society-level units. The NUTS (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics) classification subdivides each country into one or more NUTS1 




limitations. First, questions approximating corruption perception were available only in the waves 
of 2004, 2008 and 2010. Second, data about regional institutional quality that would be close 
enough to 2004 were not available. Hence, regression analysis was performed for two datasets 
pertaining to the individual-level data for 2008 and for 2010 with 47,485 and 45,637 respondents 
from 85 and 81 regions, respectively. 
 
3.1.1. Institutional trust 
The variable of institutional trust is composed of four indicators, including ‘Trust in country's 
parliament’, ‘Trust in the legal system’, ‘Trust in the police’, and ‘Trust in political parties’ (scale 
0-10), through confirmatory factor analysis (here and hereinafter the principal components 
method). The factor loadings, percentages of the total variance explained by the factor, and the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures indicating the appropriateness of the factor model for this 
and following factor models are presented in Table 1. Here and hereinafter, the shares of the total 
variance explained and the KMO measures can be viewed as acceptable (KMO measures larger 
than 0.6 or 0.5 are usually considered acceptable, although in the case of only two indicators, the 
value is always 0.5 because of the formula used for calculating the KMO measure). The factor 
scores with 0=mean  and 1. =deviationst  were saved as variables. We assume this variable to 
describe the overall trust in institutions in general with all indicators strongly correlated (factor 
loadings ranging from 0.80 to 0.88). Regarding the possible division of trust towards political and 
administrative/legal institutions (Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2016), there was no sign that the 
indicators of trust in the parliament and political parties and the indicators of trust in the legal 
system and the police would load into two separate factors. The correlations between those four 




results of the additional regression analysis show that it is rather reasonable to analyse all four 
institutional trust indicators separately along with the generalised institutional trust factor. 
[Table 1] 
 
3.1.2. Institutional performance and social trust 
We used data on institutional quality obtained from Charron et al. (2014; 2015), who calculated 
the European Quality of Government Index (EQGI) based on national-level indices of governance 
from the WGI (The World Bank, 2018; Kaufmann et al., 2010), and then corrected the data using 
survey data describing the experiences and perceptions of citizens at the regional level. The data 
for 2010/2013 based on the WGI data from 2008/2011 were used as the EQGI index based on the 
WGI data from 2010 or 2009 was not available. Corruption perception was described by two 
indicators in the 2008 ESS: ‘Doctors , nurses give special advantages or deal with everyone 
equally’ and ‘Tax authorities give special advantages or deal with everyone equally’ (scale 0-10, 
advantages=10 ). For 2010, corruption perception was described by ‘How often do police in 
country take bribes?’ and ‘How often judges in country take bribes?’ (scale 0-10). For both years, 
the indicator of corruption perception was created using confirmatory factor analysis. The social 
trust indicator is constructed through confirmatory factor analysis using three available trust items: 
‘Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful’, ‘Most people try to take advantage of you, 
or try to be fair’, and ‘Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves’ (scale 
0-10, larger values correspond to higher trust). The factor scores were again saved as variables. 
 




To describe society-level institutional trust, the mean value of the institutional trust factor and 
separate indicators was calculated for every region. Similarly, the mean values of social trust and 
corruption perception were calculated for every region. Data about Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
were obtained from Kaasa et al. (2014), who created new indicators of cultural dimensions at the 
NUTS1 level based on Hofstede’s (1980) original concept using data from the ESS (2008) and the 
European Values Survey (EVS, 2008). Every indicator resulted from a factor analysis of six initial 
questions taken from the two surveys to provide a balanced representation of them both. The 
resulting factor scores from the analysis of three levels (countries, NUTS1, NUTS2) had 0=mean  
and 1. =deviationst . As we use data only for regions included in this analysis, the means and 
standard deviations differ slightly. Only data for 2008 were available, but it can be expected that 
culture does not change quickly, which allows us to incorporate the cultural dimensions for 2008 
into both the 2008 and 2010 individual-level databases. 
The dependent variables of this analysis that describe trust towards different institutions 
characterise individuals, and the cultural dimensions describe the environment around these 
individuals. The initial questions used for creating the power distance dimension in Kaasa et al. 
(2014) also included ‘Confidence in parliament’, an indicator of societal-level institutional trust; 
and ‘Satisfied with democracy’, which is closely related to the former. Hence, the power distance 
dimension also covers some aspects of general attitudes towards institutions and can thus be 
viewed as a substitute for using just an average of particular attitudes in a region; furthermore, this 
substitute reflects many more aspects of power distance that can also influence an individual’s 
institutional trust, as explained before. Additionally, the uncertainty avoidance dimension of Kaasa 
et al. (2014) included the social trust question ‘People can be trusted’. Hence, the uncertainty 





3.1.4. Additional socioeconomic variables 
As control variables, GDP at current market prices in the purchasing power standard (PPS) per 
inhabitant and the percentage of the population aged 25-64 with tertiary education were used. Both 
indicators were drawn from Eurostat (2018). To capture the possible impact of a communist past, 
a corresponding indicator was added. Additionally, standard socioeconomic variables such as 
gender, age in years, whether the person was born in the country, years of full-time education and 
the household’s total net income from all sources (scale 1-10) were included as control variables. 




3.1.5. Variability across within-country regions 
To investigate whether the division into within-country regions is justified, we calculated the mean 
absolute deviations of our key variables in a standardized form (to enable comparability) across 
countries and within-country regions for those countries divided into regions at the NUTS1 level. 
The mean absolute deviation describes the variability of a particular indicator within that particular 
group, such as the regions of a country or countries included in the study. This robust measure was 
chosen because it is more resilient to outliers than, for instance, standard deviation where the 
distances from the mean are squared, causing large deviations to have larger weights. Usually, the 
mean absolute deviation is calculated as a mean of the absolute values of the deviations from the 




the value of that particular indicator for the whole country instead. The results are presented in 
Table 3.  
[Table 3] 
Although variability across all countries is generally larger than that inside countries, the 
variability within countries is of a comparable extent for some variables and countries, e.g., 
institutional quality in Belgium or cultural dimensions in Germany. The within-country variability 
tends to be smaller for institutional and social trust and corruption perception, but for every cultural 
dimension, there are two to six countries where the mean absolute deviation forms at least one-
third of that across the countries. Hence, considerable variability can be found within countries, 
which could also have an impact on institutional trust. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
We used multilevel modelling as our dataset has a hierarchical structure in which individuals 
represent level one, regions represent level two, and the dependent variable can be explained by 
both the individual-level and group-level variables. In line with Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), we 
standardised all variables as this translates all the results to the same scale so that they can be 
compared. Multilevel regression analysis (mixed model with fixed intercept, random intercept, and 
fixed slopes) was conducted simultaneously for 2008 and 2010. We tested whether the choice of 
multilevel modelling was justified. We started with an intercept-only model and found that the 
random intercepts (region group effects) were statistically significant. The intraclass correlations 
(ICCs) for the model with only random region effects included are 0.188 and 0.190 for 2008 and 
2010, respectively. It is suggested that multilevel modelling be used when ICC values exceed 0.05 




accepted the multilevel approach at the individual and regional levels. To investigate the potential 
multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were calculated; and for the models presented 
later, they were all below the conventional level of 10. 












where ijtrustInst.  is our institutional trust variable created from four initial indicators, the subscript 
kij represents the effect of the kth individual-level variable, the subscript lj represents the effect of 
the lth regional-level variable, ju  represents the random intercept in the equation, and ij  the 
individual-level residuals. Regarding potential endogeneity, we acknowledge the possibility that 
an individual’s institutional trust might have an impact on this individual’s general social trust or 
perception of corruption, but we believe that the causal direction is rather from general to more 
specific and from experience to attitude. We do not expect the institutional trust of a particular 
individual to influence the cultural context as culture is shaped throughout a longer period of time 
and thus is quite stable. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
The results of various model specifications for institutional trust are presented in Tables 4 and 5 
(2008 and 2010). We present standardised regression coefficients in order to enable a comparison 
of the relative importance of various variables. First, only individual-level variables were included 
in the analysis (Model 1). A model with only individual-level control variables was also tested. 




presented to save space. Next, society-level control variables and institutional quality were added 
(2). Finally, variables describing the cultural environment were added to the model one by one (3-
10) for two reasons. First, society-level institutional trust, social trust and corruption perception, 
cultural dimensions and a communist background can be viewed as alternative explanations for 
individual-level institutional trust, all covering one aspect of cultural context. Second, there are 
strong correlations among those variables. Similarly, because of multicollinearity issues, GDP and 
institutional quality had to be left out when society-level institutional trust, social trust or 
corruption perception were included. The Akaike information criterion indicating the goodness of 
fit (where a smaller value indicates a better fit) shows that the fit increased when regional-level 
controls were added, and the models with power distance had the best fit for both 2008 and 2010. 
[Table 4] 
[Table 5] 
The coefficients for corruption perception are negative, statistically significant, and of the same 
magnitude even though the measurement of corruption perception was based on giving special 
advantages in 2008 and on taking bribes in 2010. These coefficients remain the same after adding 
the regional-level institutional quality variable into the model. This relationship is somewhat 
stronger for 2010, which seems logical as taking bribes is usually more associated with corruption. 
Social trust appears positively related to institutional trust; the coefficients are statistically 
significant and stable across all model specifications. 
The institutional quality of a region appeared to have positive and statistically significant 
coefficients for both years and all specifications, but the relative importance is smaller than those 
for individual-level social trust and corruption perception and even smaller when power distance 




to the individual’s institutional trust with the same magnitude as for individual-level social trust 
and corruption perception. For regional social trust and regional corruption perception, the 
coefficients are smaller. Living in a region with a communist background appeared to have no 
significant relationship with an individual’s institutional trust. 
Regarding cultural dimensions, power distance is negatively and statistically significantly 
related to an individual’s institutional trust. This confirms that a larger power distance results in 
less participation, passive attitudes dominating more, and fewer contacts between citizens and 
institutions, which lower an individual’s institutional trust. The coefficients have a smaller 
absolute value for 2010 than for 2008. Although culture is not expected to change fast, one cannot 
rule out the possibility that this can be explained with a lag: the power distance indicator for the 
year 2008 was used in both cases. The magnitudes of the coefficients of power distance are again 
smaller than those of the individual-level corruption perception and social trust but comparable 
and larger than those of institutional quality. The other cultural dimensions were not statistically 
significant. These results are robust to the different indicators used for corruption perception in 
2008 and 2010. A reviewer also drew our attention to the possibility that the influence mechanism 
of cultural dimensions on an individual’s institutional trust could run through social trust rather 
than directly. We repeated our analysis with an individual’s social trust as a dependent variable, 
but none of the cultural dimensions were statistically significant for an individual’s social trust. 
 
4.2. Extension: results for separate institutional trust components 
In the main models, we used the institutional trust factor created from four variables describing 
trust in the parliament, political parties, the legal system, and the police. As an extension, we 




similar to Tables 4 and 5 to save space (they are available on the first author’s web page), but we 
present an overview of our results in Table 6. 
[Table 6] 
The findings for 2008 and 2010 are again similar to each other, and the results regarding an 
individual’s social trust, an individual’s corruption perception, and the cultural-level aggregates of 
trust in a particular institution, social trust and corruption perception are similar to those discussed 
before. Institutional quality, however, is more weakly related to trust in political parties and the 
country’s parliament. Hence, here, the division between political and administrative/legal 
institutions (Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2016) seems relevant, and the institutional quality index 
measuring rather the administrative aspect is more related to trust in administrative/legal 
institutions. 
Regarding cultural dimensions, interesting differences emerged. Power distance appeared 
negatively and statistically significantly related to all types of institutional trust except for trust in 
the police. Here, in turn, uncertainty avoidance appears statistically significant: people from 
regions with higher uncertainty avoidance tend to trust the police more. Regarding trust in political 
parties, uncertainty avoidance and for 2010 also masculinity appeared significant in addition to 
power distance. An individual’s trust towards political parties is higher in regions with lower 
uncertainty avoidance and masculine values dominating over feminine. The positive relationship 
between uncertainty avoidance and trust in the police might be due to the perception that the police 
are closer to people than to the other public institutions involved in our analysis. The police, 
providing order and security, helps to overcome uncertainty in contexts with predominant values 
of adherence to norms and personal security (Hogg, 2000). In such contexts, institutions aiming to 




In contrast, political parties might be viewed as institutions with unpredictable behaviour that are 
conflict prone; hence, there is a negative association with uncertainty avoidance. A positive 
association between masculinity and trust in political parties can be explained by an overlap 
between the value-orientation system dominating in the political parties and that typical of 
Hofstede’s masculine society (Aylott and Bolin, 2017; Ennser-Jedenastik and Muller, 2015). 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The cultural context matters for an individual’s institutional trust since it may precondition the 
way citizens perceive public institutions. Developing specific policy recommendations for optimal 
solutions is, however, challenging. First, cultural changes are slow, and it is unlikely that new 
policies might influence cultural evolution (Davis and Williamson, 2016). Second, policies 
properly functioning in some contexts might not perform in the same way when transferred to 
other contexts with a different cultural pattern (Cline and Williamson, 2017; Grimmelikhuijsen 
and Porumbescu, 2013). 
Our results show that an individual’s institutional trust is higher in regions with smaller 
power distance. It is possible that a large power distance induces citizens to develop feelings of 
vulnerability and powerlessness against government decisions (Grimmelikhuijsen and 
Porumbescu, 2013). In such a context, individuals might sense a lack of institutional 
responsiveness to citizens’ concerns. This makes citizens perceive the state-citizen relationship as 
subordinate without an actual opportunity to influence decision-making processes. The sense of 
being involved and seeing citizens’ interests taken into account is important for institutional trust. 
The government being perceived as trustworthy and believed to enforce the law, assure property 




Hence, we suggest that in cultural contexts with large power distance, policy makers might 
need to adopt more inclusive decision-making processes, reduce the perceived distance between 
the government and citizens and boost citizens’ perception of the government’s fairness and 
responsiveness to citizens’ needs. Increasing public participation in a decision-making process has 
consistently been advocated (Herian et al., 2012). This could actualise in the creation of accessible 
spaces and forums, virtual or physical, where political leaders and public administrators consult 
citizens on various aspects of the decision-making process, ranging from policy development to 
its application and assessment. Such communication channels are rare in highly hierarchical 
environments, but public consultation practices have already been a part of central and local 
governments’ modernisation agendas in some countries, e.g., the UK (Lowndes et al., 2006). This 
could promote a sense of organisational belonging and feeling of being involved. From a public 
management perspective, this requires a change in the approach to citizens. Citizens become 
stakeholders and active ‘consumers’ of public administration services rather than simply passive 
and dependent ‘clients’ (Lowndes et al., 2006). 
This reasoning might also explain the relationship between institutions and citizens in 
Eastern European countries more consistently than simply their communist past. Our results did 
not indicate a statistically significant difference in an individual’s institutional trust caused by a 
communist background. Hence, much of the reasoning behind the impact of a communist past 
seems to be covered by cultural dimensions, especially power distance. It is easy to draw a line 
along this historical divide, but the actual reasons for lower institutional trust in post-communist 
countries might not lie in this division, but rather lie in some aspects of culture that might also 




not exclude, of course, the possibility that a communist past has had a role in increasing the power 
distance in post-communist societies. 
Several limitations have to be acknowledged. Not all European countries were covered in 
the ESS dataset. Hence, when data with wider coverage become available, it would be interesting 
to repeat the analysis. The selection of control variables was limited at the regional level, e.g., it 
was not possible to include income inequality. The indicators for the perception of corruption were 
not the same for 2008 and 2010. However, the similarity of the results validates the findings and 
suggests that the two indicators describe a similar concept. The set of cultural dimensions used is 
one of many, and if data were available for another set of dimensions, this would complement the 
knowledge about the impact of cultural context. Hence, there are several possibilities for further 
research. 
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Table A1. Results of the confirmatory factor analysis, 2008 and 2010 
  2008:   2010:   











Institutional trust Trust in country's parliament 0.87 70.63 0.78 0.88 71.71 0.77 
Trust in the legal system 0.87   0.88   
 Trust in political parties 0.81   0.84   
 Trust in the police 0.81   0.80   
Social trust Most people can be trusted 0.85 71.96 0.71 0.85 70.39 0.70 
Most people try to be fair 0.87   0.85   
 Most of the time people helpful 0.83   0.82   
Corruption perception 
(special advantages) 
Doctors, nurses give special advantages 0.89 78.46 0.50    
Tax authorities give special advantages 0.89      
Corruption perception 
(bribes) 
How often do police in country take bribes    0.92 84.83 0.50 






Table 2. Descriptive statistics, 2008 and 2010 
 2008:    2010:    
Variable Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Individual-level:         
Institutional trust -2.097 2.546 0 1 -2.030 2.611 0 1 
Gender (male=1) 0 1 0.460 0.498 0 1 0.460 0.498 
Age 15 105 48.020 18.437 14 101 48.700 18.738 
Education 0 50 12.140 4.109 0 50 12.260 4.151 
Income 1 10 5.480 2.774 1 10 5.080 2.809 
Born in country (= 1) 0 1 0.910 0.284 0 1 0.900 0.297 
Social trust -2.466 2.450 0 1 -2.557 2.492 0 1 
Corruption perception -1.997 2.008 0 1 -1.553 2.519 0 1 
Regional-level:         
GDP 8600 55700 25645.882 9568.208 8300 56100 25530.864 8984.412 
Tertiary education 10.30 41.60 26.063 7.070 15.20 45.90 28.530 6.752 
Institutional quality -1.98 1.64 0.334 0.887 -1.91 1.66 0.386 0.759 
Cultural-level institutional trust -1.21 1.03 0.020 0.409 -0.90 0.97 0.059 0.410 
Cultural-level social trust -0.90 0.88 -0.006 0.396 -0.92 0.84 0.028 0.365 
Cultural-level corruption perception -0.78 1.03 0.027 0.487 -1.00 1.17 -0.091 0.495 
Post-communist (=1) 0 1 0.247 0.434 0 1 0.210 0.410 
Power distance -2.38 1.67 -0.189 0.825 -2.38 1.67 -0.257 0.780 
Uncertainty avoidance -2.40 1.78 -0.182 0.953 -2.40 1.78 -0.234 0.951 
Masculinity -1.80 2.32 -0.218 0.956 -1.80 2.32 -0.319 0.875 

























2008:          
All 
countries 
25 0.974 0.942 0.892 0.854 0.902 0.876 0.829 0.871 
All NUTS1 
regions 
85 0.697 0.773 0.900 0.830 0.729 0.803 0.782 0.817 
Regions of:          
Belgium 3 0.175 0.382 0.130 0.722 0.170 0.299 0.108 0.120 
Bulgaria 2 0.250 0.220 0.278 0.234 0.104 0.041 0.094 0.100 
France 8 0.077 0.095 0.126 0.152 0.163 0.326 0.247 0.320 
Germany 16 0.295 0.268 0.314 0.187 0.513 0.540 0.297 0.541 
Greece 4 0.353 0.421 0.278 0.405 0.084 0.162 0.233 0.301 
Hungary 3 0.030 0.024 0.117 0.327 0.139 0.179 0.108 0.375 
Netherlands 4 0.023 0.201 0.082 0.190 0.061 0.134 0.086 0.134 
Poland 6 0.148 0.154 0.100 0.058 0.206 0.105 0.098 0.161 
Romania 4 0.262 0.293 0.124 0.324 0.321 0.111 0.167 0.445 
Spain 7 0.267 0.408 0.179 0.295 0.287 0.199 0.402 0.530 
Sweden 3 0.144 0.065 0.007 0.082 0.227 0.186 0.129 0.165 
United 
Kingdom 
12 0.178 0.177 0.096 0.221 0.302 0.248 0.240 0.264 
2010:          
All 
countries 
24 0.999 0.996 0.967 0.926 0.916 0.853 0.819 0.910 
All NUTS1 
regions 
81 0.677 0.743 0.798 0.776 0.694 0.789 0.754 0.779 
Regions of:          
Belgium 3 0.053 0.302 0.159 0.755 0.177 0.301 0.117 0.112 
Bulgaria 2 0.158 0.026 0.134 0.405 0.109 0.041 0.102 0.094 
France 8 0.102 0.143 0.122 0.236 0.171 0.328 0.268 0.298 
Germany 16 0.412 0.264 0.208 0.233 0.537 0.543 0.316 0.505 
Greece 4 0.158 0.369 0.258 0.155 0.088 0.163 0.253 0.281 
Hungary 3 0.060 0.069 0.089 0.169 0.145 0.180 0.117 0.350 
Netherlands 4 0.085 0.181 0.110 0.060 0.064 0.135 0.094 0.125 
Poland 6 0.207 0.263 0.249 0.156 0.216 0.105 0.106 0.150 
Spain 7 0.094 0.274 0.197 0.246 0.301 0.200 0.437 0.494 
Sweden 5 0.053 0.155 0.064 0.072 0.238 0.187 0.140 0.154 
United 
Kingdom 





Table 4. Estimation results of the multilevel mixed model (standardised coefficients) for institutional trust, 2008  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Fixed effects:           



































































































































































Regional-level:           
GDP  0.139*** 
(0.000) 




























Inst. quality  0.173*** 
(0.000) 










Cultural-level inst. trust   0.342*** 
(0.000) 
       
Cult.-level social trust    0.143*** 
(0.001) 
      
Cult.-level corr. perception     -0.134*** 
(0.000) 
     
Post-communist      -0.017 
(0.569) 
    
Power distance       -0.149*** 
(0.001) 
   





Masculinity         0.036 
(0.320) 
 
Individualism          0.015 
(0.530) 
Random effects:           






















Observations 47485 47485 47485 47485 47485 47485 47485 47485 47485 47485 
Number of regions 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Akaike Inform. Criterion 59360 59326 59274 59354 59364 59330 59209 59220 59217 59217 
Note: p-values in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels. 
 
 
Table 5. Estimation results of the multilevel mixed model (standardised coefficients) for institutional trust, 2010  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Fixed effects:           



































































































































































Regional-level:           
GDP  0.064** 
(0.025) 































Inst. quality  0.162*** 
(0.000) 










Cultural-level inst. trust   0.289*** 
(0.000) 
       
Cult.-level social trust    0.196*** 
(0.000) 
      
Cult.-level corr. perception     -0.186*** 
(0.000) 
     
Post-communist      0.006 
(0.829) 
    
Power distance       -0.104*** 
(0.001) 
   
Uncertainty avoidance        -0.050 
(0.118) 
  
Masculinity         -0.031 
(0.249) 
 
Individualism          -0.019 
(0.464) 
Random effects:           






















Observations 45637 45637 45637 45637 45637 45637 45637 45637 45637 45637 
Number of regions 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Akaike Inform. Criterion 59771 59736 59650 59734 59741 59741 59634 59639 59640 59641 




Table 6. Overview of the results of the multilevel regression analyses (2008 and 2010) 
Individual-level dependent variable: Institutional 














Individual-level:      
Social trust + + + + + 
Corruption perception – – – – – 
Regional-level:      
Institutional quality + (+) (+) + + 
Cultural-level aggregate of dependent var. + + + + + 
Cultural-level social trust + + + + + 
Cultural-level corruption perception – – – – – 
Communist background      
Power distance – – – –  
Uncertainty avoidance   –  + 
Masculinity   (+)   
Individualism      
Note: ‘+’/‘–’ denote a positive/negative statistically significant (here and hereafter at least at the 0.05 
level) regression coefficient, ‘(+)’ denotes a positive relationship that is not statistically significant for 
some model specifications, empty cells mean no statistically significant relationship. 
 
 
 
 
